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Self-location—the sense of where I am in space—provides an experiential anchor
for one’s interaction with the environment. In the studies of full-body illusions, many
researchers have defined self-location solely in terms of body-location—the subjective
feeling of where my body is. Although this view is useful, there is an issue regarding
whether it can fully accommodate the role of 1PP-location—the sense of where my
first-person perspective is located in space. In this study, we investigate self-location
by comparing body-location and 1PP-location: using a head-mounted display (HMD)
and a stereo camera, the subjects watched their own body standing in front of them
and received tactile stimulations. We manipulated their senses of body-location and
1PP-location in three different conditions: the participants standing still (Basic condition),
asking them to move forward (Walking condition), and swiftly moving the stereo camera
away from their body (Visual condition). In theWalking condition, the participants watched
their body moving away from their 1PP. In the Visual condition, the scene seen via the
HMD was systematically receding. Our data show that, under different manipulations of
movement, the spatial unity between 1PP-location and body-location can be temporarily
interrupted. Interestingly, we also observed a “double-body effect.” We further suggest
that it is better to consider body-location and 1PP-location as interrelated but distinct
factors that jointly support the sense of self-location.
Keywords: self-location, body-location, first-person perspective, body ownership, double-body effect
INTRODUCTION
The sense of self-location has been regarded as a key component of bodily self-consciousness,
especially in the research of full-body illusions (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Blanke
andMetzinger, 2009; Serino et al., 2013; Maselli, 2015). How is self-location defined in this research
field? As a first approximation, the sense of self-location is the subjective feeling of where I am
in space (Ionta et al., 2011, p. 363; Blanke, 2012, p. 556; Pfeiffer et al., 2014, p. 4021). This
understanding is natural, but can only serve as a starting point for investigation. To step forward,
many researchers specify the sense of self-location in terms of the sense of body-location—the sense
of where my body is. In the study by Lenggenhager et al. (2007, p. 1096), participants watched their
virtual body in the front while receiving tactile stimulations on the back.Many of themmislocalized
themselves “toward the virtual body” during the synchronous condition (2007, p. 1096).
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Other studies confirmed the findings using different kind of
measures, from “the mental ball dropping test” in Lenggenhager
et al. (2009), the proprioceptive drift measurement by Aspell
et al. (2009), to the measures of peripersonal space by Noel et al.
(2015), etc. In the review by Serino et al. (2013), self-location was
defined as “the experience of being a body with a given location
within the environment” (2013, p. 1239). Applying virtual reality
techniques to study bodily illusions,Maselli and Slater (2014) also
depicted self-location as “the experience of the body occupying
a given portion of space in the environment” (2014, p. 1).
Finally, in the fMRI study by Guterstam et al. (2015), self-location
was characterized as “the experience that the body is located
somewhere in space” (2015, p. 1416). Overall, this definition
identifies self-location with body-location, or at least regards the
former as determined by the latter.
To be sure, it is very useful to specify self-location in terms of
body-location because it not only prevents the Cartesian chasm
between self and body, but also makes the notion of self-location
experimentally operational. Still, there is a concern: does this
way of understanding do justice to another key factor in the
sense of self-location, i.e., first-person perspective (1PP)? In this
study, we assume that the most relevant aspect of 1PP with
regard to self-location is its location. It is via its location that 1PP
makes contribution to the sense of self-location. So we will speak
about the sense of 1PP-location—the sense of where my first-
person perspective is located in space. Also, in this study both
body-location and 1PP-location refer to participants’ subjective
experiences rather than the physical locations of their real body
or eyes. Thus, during an out-of-body illusion, a subject could feel
his/her body-location to be in a place different from the location
of his/her real body (Lenggenhager et al., 2009). Similarly, under
experimental manipulations, one’s sense of 1PP-location could be
separated from where one’s eyes are physically located in space.
Most studies of self-location, including those just mentioned
above, recognize that 1PP plays an important role in the sense
of self-location. In the study by Ehrsson (2007), the participants
were stroked on the chest which was blocked from view, and
saw the stroking applied to a position slightly below the camera.
The participants felt as if they were sitting behind their physical
body and were looking at it from the location of their “illusory
body” (2007, p. 1048). Notice that, in this study the location of the
illusory body was determined by the location of the manipulated
1PP (i.e., the location of the camera; cf. also the chest-stroking
case in Lenggenhager et al., 2009). In the fMRI study by Ionta
et al. (2011), the participants used a cursor to indicate the
direction of their 1PP: they felt that they were either looking
upward or looking downwards. In our terms, Ionta et al. defined
the direction in terms of the location of 1PP (“From where do
I perceive the world,” cf. 2011, p. 363). The results showed that
“temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) activity reflected experimental
changes in self-location that also depended on the first-person
perspective” (2011, p. 363, cf. also p. 370, 371). Thus, Serino
et al. (2013) suggested that “perspective is not wholly distinct
from self-location” (2013, p. 1240, authors’ emphasis). Finally,
in studying judgments about self-location, Starmans and Bloom
(2012) found that “children and adults intuitively think of the
self as occupying a physical location within the body, close to
the eyes” (2012, p. 317). Bertossa et al. (2008) also suggested that
“Human volunteers generally seem to find it easy and natural to
locate their center of self, the place ‘I am’ or the I-that-perceives.
With considerable consistency, sighted or blind, Western or non-
Western, it is placed somewhere near the center of their head”
(2008, p. 333). Another study by Alsmith and Longo (2014) found
that most self-location judgments pointed to either upper face
or upper torso. All of these studies indicate a close connection
between self-location and the location of 1PP.
Now, if the role of 1PP-location can be incorporated into
the role of body-location, then there is probably no need to
include the notion of 1PP-location in the definition of self-
location. But, is this indeed the case? Before articulating this
issue, we will make a few remarks to clarify our terminology.
First, although 1PP often refers to one’s visual perspective,
there is more to it. Other types of information, such as tactile,
proprioceptive, vestibular signals, etc. also contribute to one’s
egocentric reference frame. On the other hand, in order to
make the notion of 1PP experimentally operational, many studies
consider 1PP as referring to visual perspective. This is reasonable
since vision often plays a dominant role relative to other sensory
modalities, which is important in the research of full-body
illusions. In this study we will operate with the visual notion of
1PP in our experiments, but will take non-visual information
into consideration as well. Second, in a recent review, Maselli
(2015) defined visual-perspective as “the point from which visual
information from the environment is gathered” (2015, p. S309).
She chose the term “visual-perspective” instead of “1PP” to avoid
confusion with “first-person visual perspective over the fake
body” (2015, p. S309). In this study, we will continue to use “1PP”
with this caution in mind.
Both body-location and 1PP-location are maintained and
influenced by vision, proprioception, somatosensation, and
vestibular information. Both are forms of subjective spatial
awareness that usually match and integrated with each other.
For example, while watching a live baseball game in a stadium,
as I move from the outfield to an infield seat, my sense of
body location becomes different and my sense of 1PP-location
changes accordingly as well. However, we think that there are
at least two reasons suggesting that 1PP-location plays a role
in self-location that is distinct from body-location, and that
a better characterization of self-location should include both
body-location and 1PP-location. First, out-of-body experiences
(OBE) have been described as a type of abnormal self-location,
characterized by a sense of disembodiment and an experience of
looking at one’s own body from an elevated and distanced 1PP
(Blanke and Mohr, 2005, p. 186; Serino et al., 2013, p. 1243).
For example, an OBE subject reported that “she saw her whole
body as if she were outside, from an external and superior point
of view” (Maillard et al., 2004). Another subject said that “she
felt she was floating above it and could view her body and its
surroundings from above” (Greyson et al., 2014). Blanke and
Mohr said that “During an OBE people seem to be awake and
feel that their ‘self,’ or center of awareness, is located outside of
the physical body and somewhat elevated. It is from this elevated
extrapersonal location that the subjects experience seeing their
body and the world” (2005, p. 186). These descriptions clearly
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suggest that, in the case of OBE, the sense of self-location is
dissociated from the sense of body-location and tied to the sense
of 1PP-location. If self-location is depicted only in terms of body-
location, how to characterize OBE would become a problem.
Hence, 1PP, more precisely, the location of 1PP, is important
for specifying self-location, and its role is not the same as body-
location.
To see the second reason, consider what Maselli (2015) calls
the front-stroking and the back-stroking paradigms in the studies
of full-body illusions. As mentioned earlier, participants in the
front-stroking paradigm felt themselves to be in the location of
the unseen illusory body (Ehrsson, 2007) and they experienced
ownership of that illusory body (Guterstam and Ehrsson, 2012).
Here, it is crucial to note that the location of the illusory body
was determined by the location of the manipulated 1PP (i.e., the
location of the camera), not the other way around. In the back-
stroking case, participants mislocalized themselves toward the
virtual body, and some (but not all) of them also experienced it as
their own (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). It is worth emphasizing
that the virtual body was seen as located 2m in front of the
subject precisely because the camera was positioned 2m behind
the subject. These observations suggest that the role of 1PP-
location cannot be replaced by body-location. A better picture
of self-location seems to be the following: in both the front-
stroking and the back-stroking paradigms, self-location requires
interaction between body-location and 1PP-location, and it is
likely that body-location and 1PP-location are different factors
in the sense of self-location.
If 1PP-location and body-location are not the same, will this
provide any support to the dualism between self and body? The
answer is negative. In everyday life, we experience ourselves as
being in the location from where we can perceive the world. Our
sense of self-location seems to lock into the 1PP-location given
by ordinary experience. Moreover, this ordinary 1PP-location is
not an abstract geometric point. There is a sense of embodiment
tied to it: we feel that we have a body in (or in line with) that
location, from where we can touch and act upon the world.
Hence, recognizing the role of 1PP-location in the sense of self-
location will not risk falling into Cartesian dualism. In addition,
in our previous study on the “self-touching illusion” (Liang et al.,
2015), we observed a double-body effect: we manipulated the
participant’s visual perspective while letting him/her interact with
the experimenter, such that the subject was touching someone
and being touched at the same time, as well as watching his/her
own body in front of him/herself. In the two synchronous full-
body conditions, many participants felt not only that “I was
brushing my own hand” but also that “It felt that I had two
bodies” (2015, p. 3–5, Supplementary Materials). If the double-
body effect is a solid phenomenon, it would support that 1PP-
location is embodied such that there is no tendency toward
dualism.
In this study, we investigate self-location by addressing the
following issues: first, can the spatial integration of body-location
and 1PP-location be temporarily modified? Second, is it possible
for healthy subjects to have the illusory experience of owning
two bodies? In most previous studies, including both the back-
stroking and the front-stroking paradigms, both body-location
and 1PP-location remained still throughout the experimental
procedures. In this study, we used a back-stroking set-up and
added in various forms of movement to study body-location and
1PP-location. We aim to propose a refinement of the current
picture that characterizes self-location solely in terms of body-
location.
Four experiments were conducted to address the above
issues: the participants wore an HMD connected with a stereo
camera behind them so that they watched their own body
standing in front of them while receiving tactile stimulations.
Depending on the experiments, the subjects either stood still
(Basic condition), or were instructed to walk straight ahead
such that they watched their body moving away from the
position of their visual perspective (Walking condition), or
the experimenter moved the stereo camera away from the
subjects’ body such that their visual content was systematically
receding (Visual condition). Experiment 1 performed the Basic
condition. The goal was to verify whether we could induce a
bodily illusion similar to the one reported by Lenggenhager
et al. (2007), and the results will provide a basis to compare
with the data collected in the other conditions. Experiment
2 carried out the Walking condition to see (1) whether a
variant of body-ownership illusion could be induced in this
condition, and (2) whether the walking movement may modify
the participant’s sense of body-location. Experiment 3 conducted
the Visual condition in order to test: (1) whether another
version of body-ownership illusion could be induced in this
set-up, (2) whether moving the stereo camera may influence
the participant’s sense of 1PP-location, and (3) whether it is
possible for healthy subjects to feel as if they have more
than one body. Finally, in Experiment 4 we performed the
synchronous conditions of all the above three experiments. This
would enable us to compare the three major conditions so as
to investigate the relationship between body-location and 1PP-
location.
By conducting these experiments, we intended to test the
following hypotheses: (1) the spatial unity between body-
location and 1PP-location can be temporarily interrupted in
some experimental conditions; and (2) the illusory experience
of owning two bodies can be induced. If both hypotheses were
verified, they would show that, first, body-location and 1PP-
location are two distinct factors in the sense of self-location,
and that a better characterization of self-location should include
both body-location and 1PP-location. Second, the double-body
effect would support the view that the sense of 1PP-location
is essentially embodied. Hence, in recognizing the role of 1PP-
location, the worry about dualism will not arise. We will discuss
the implications of our experimental results and address the
issues raised above.
METHODS
Participants
All four experiments in this study adopted within-subjects
designs. Totally, we recruited 86 healthy volunteers. See Table 1
below for the details of the participants. All participants gave
their written consent prior to the experiments. All experiments
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TABLE 1 | Overview of experiments.
Experiment Description Measures taken Participants
Experiment 1 Sync. condition Questionnaire 21 (♂ 10)
SCR M = 21.95 ± 2.12
Async. condition Questionnaire
SCR
Experiment 2 Sync. condition Questionnaire 20 (♂ 14)
SCR M = 23.40 ± 4.48
Async. condition Questionnaire
SCR
Experiment 3 Sync. condition Questionnaire 20 (♂ 8)
SCR M = 22.13 ± 1.89
Async. condition Questionnaire
SCR
Experiment 4 Basic condition Questionnaire 25 (♂ 15)
Walking condition Questionnaire M = 22.56 ± 3.44
Visual condition Questionnaire
were conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
This study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of
National Taiwan University (NTU-REC: 201501HS009).
Materials and Procedures
We used a head mounted display (HMD, Sony HMZ-T1) and a
stereo camera (Sony HDR-TD20V) to conduct four experiments.
The questionnaires were structured using a Likert scale from
“strongly disagree” (−3) to “strongly agree” (+3), and the
statements were distributed randomly; they can be divided
into the following categories: 1PP-location, body-location, body-
ownership, 1PP-location vs. body-location, double-body effect,
and positive control (Table 3). Since the purpose of Experiment
1 was to compare our results with those of Lenggenhager et al.
(2007), we adjusted the questionnaire in the following way:
Q5 was reformulated as “It felt as if the body in front of me
was mine.” We also removed Q2, Q4, Q6, and Q7 from the
questionnaire, and added in two statements about touch referral
(see Table 2). We also had a screen-switch machine (ATEN,
VM5808H, Taiwan) that can switch between the images taken by
the stereo camera and other computer images. It allowed us to
present questionnaires on the HMD.
The skin conductance responses (SCR) were recorded with a
Data Acquisition Unit-MP35 (Biopac Systems, Inc. USA). SCR
was measured in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions
of Experiments 1–3, in which a knife was shown on the
HMD scene, then cut toward the participant’s physical body.
To measure SCR, two single-use foam electrodes (Covidien,
Inc., Mansfield, USA) were attached to the lower edge of the
participant’s right palm on the volar surfaces of the medial
phalanges. Data were registered at a sample rate of 200 Hz,
and analyzed with the Biopac software AcqKnowledge v. 3.7.7.
We identified the amplitude of SCR as the difference between
the maximal and minimal values of the responses within 5 s
TABLE 2 | The questionnaire statements in Experiment 1.
1PP-location Q1. It felt as if the position of my first-person perspective
had changed.
Body-location Q3. It felt as if the location of my body had changed.
Body-ownership Q5. If felt as if the body in front of me was mine.
1PP-location vs.
Body-location
Q8. My first-person perspective seemed to be in the back
of my body.
Q9. It felt as if the position of my first-person perspective
and my body were not in the same location.
Double-body
effect
Q10. It felt as if I had a body here and also had another
body in front of me.
Positive control Q11. I was being brushed during the experiment.
Q12. It felt as if I were feeling the touch of the brush in the
location where I saw the virtual body touched.
Touch referral Q13. It felt as if I were feeling the touch caused by the
brush touching the virtual body.
The questionnaires were in Chinese when presented to the participants. Here and in
Table 3 we present the English translations.
TABLE 3 | The questionnaire statements in Experiments 2–4.
1PP-location Q1. It felt as if the position of my first-person perspective
had changed.
Q2. It felt as if the position of my first-person perspective
had not changed.
Body-location Q3. It felt as if the location of my body had changed.
Q4. It felt as if the location of my body had not changed.
Body-ownership Q5. It felt as if the body on the screen was mine.
1PP-location vs.
Body-location
Q6. It felt as if my body left the position of my first-person
perspective.
Q7. It felt as if the position of my first-person perspective left
my body.
Q8. My first-person perspective seemed to be located
behind my body.
Q9. It felt as if the position of my first-person perspective
and my body were not in the same location.
Double-body
effect
Q10. It felt as if I had a body here and had another body in
front of me.
Positive control Q11. I was being brushed during the experiment.
of the threat (Dawson et al., 2007). All subjects were informed
beforehand that after the experiment they would orally answer
a questionnaire presented on their HMD. They were advised
to give their answers spontaneously based on their subjective
feeling rather than on reasoning. Those subjects who did not
show any SCR amplitude and those who did not pass the positive
control (i.e., answered negatively to Q11) were excluded from
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental set-ups. (A) Experiment 1 and the Basic
condition of Experiment 4. The participant wore an HMD connected with a
stereo camera positioned 2m behind and received tactile stimulations for 70 s.
(B) Experiment 2 and the Walking condition of Experiment 4. The participant
wore an HMD connected with a stereo camera positioned 30 cm behind and
received tactile stimulations for 70 s. At the 20th s, the subject was instructed
to walk straight ahead for about 2 m. (C) Experiment 3 and the Visual
condition of Experiment 4. The participant wore an HMD connected with a
stereo camera positioned 30 cm behind and received tactile stimulations for
70 s. At the 20th s, the experimenter swiftly moved the stereo camera away
from the participant’s body for about 2 m.
the analyses. Totally, we excluded the data of three participants,
including their SCR and questionnaires. See below for the
procedures of each experiment.
Experiment 1: Basic Condition (Sync. vs.
Async.)
The participant put on an HMD connected with a stereo camera
positioned 2m behind him/her (Figure 1A). The participant also
wore mini-headphones in order to listen to white noise during
the experiment. Then the participant was asked to keep his/her
eyes closed and wait for the announcement to begin. When the
participant opened his/her eyes, he/she saw the back of his/her
full body standing in front of him/herself from below the neck.
This visual content of the HMD was real-time streaming of the
video recording from the stereo camera. The intrinsic delay of
the actual streaming was within 20–40 ms. The participant was
brushed on the back for 70 s. In the synchronous condition, the
visual content matched synchronously with respect to the tactile
stimulations. The frequency of the brushing was about once per
second. In the asynchronous condition, we played a pre-recorded
video on the HMD such that the subject watched his/her back
being brushed at a constant speed of about 2 s per stroke. At the
same time, the experimenter brushed the participant’s back and
varied the frequency randomly from 1 to 3 s per stroke, so that
the touch that the participant felt was not consistent with what
he/she saw. SCR was measured in both conditions at the 60th s: a
knife was first shown on the HMD scene for 1 s, then cut toward
the participant’s upper back (i.e., toward the participant’s adopted
3PP) for another 1 s. After the experiment, the participant orally
responded to a questionnaire presented on the HMD.
Experiment 2: Walking Condition (Sync. vs.
Async.)
The stereo camera was positioned only about 30 cm behind
the participant. In the synchronous condition, the participant
received synchronous tactile stimulations. At the 20th s, the
subject was instructed to walk straight ahead for about 2m and
then was asked to stop (Figure 1B). The average walking velocity
was about 0.67m/s. Since the stereo camera remained in the same
position, the walking movement caused changes in the subject’s
proprioception and visual content: the subject proprioceptively
felt that his/her body was moving ahead, while at the same time
watching his/her own body moving away from his/her visual
perspective. The procedure of the asynchronous condition was
the same, except that the brushing was asynchronous. In both
conditions, the participant received tactile stimulations on the
back for 70 s, followed by the same SCR measurement and
questionnaires.
Experiment 3: Visual Condition (Sync. vs.
Async.)
The stereo camera was again positioned about 30 cm behind the
participant, who was brushed on the back either synchronously
or asynchronously for 70 s. The new factor was that, at the
20th s, while the subject was standing still, the experimenter
swiftly moved the stereo camera away from the subject’s body
for about 2m (Figure 1C). The average velocity with which
the camera was moved back was about 1.33 m/s. This was
to change the location of the participant’s 1PP, such that the
scene that the subject saw via the HMD systematically receded.
The rest of the procedure was the same as in the above two
experiments.
Experiment 4: Basic, Walking, and Visual
Conditions (Sync.)
In this experiment, we conducted the Basic, Walking, and Visual
conditions (Figures 1A–C) with only synchronous brushing and
did not measure SCR. In each of these conditions, the participant
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saw via the HMD the back of his/her full body standing in front
of him/herself from below the neck, and was brushed on the back
for 70 s, followed by a questionnaire.
Data Analyses and Statistics
To analyze the questionnaire and SCR data collected in
Experiments 1–3, we found that they were not normally
distributed (using Shapiro–Wilk tests), so we used the non-
parametric Wilcoxon’s matched-pairs signed-rank tests to
compare the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. For
Experiment 4, we conducted Friedman’s analyses of variance by
ranks to determine whether there were significant differences
among the three conditions, followed by Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests with Bonferroni correction as post-hoc analyses.
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were also carried out to compare
Q6 in the Walking and the Basic conditions, and Q7 in the
Visual and the Basic conditions. We adopted relatively high
standards when interpreting the questionnaire data: in addition
to the requirement that differences in data must be statistically
significant (α = 0.05), the absolute value of the median of a
major factor (such as 1PP-location, body-location, or double-
body effect) must be at least one (cf. Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2012). More precisely, if there was an effect on 1PP-location,
the median of the positive statement Q1 must be at least
positive one (+1), and the median of the negative statement
Q2 must be at least negative one (−1). Likewise, if there
was an effect on body-location, then Q3 must be at least +1
and the negative statement Q4 must be at least −1. All the
other statements were formulated in positive terms, so their
median values should reach at least +1 before we claimed to
have observed genuine effects. The idea here is that if the
absolute value of a median was <1, the group of participants
would be considered to be uncertain about the questionnaire
statement.
RESULTS
Experiment 1
In this section, we report only the experimental results from
significant comparisons. The median values and interquartile
ranges (IQRs) of the questionnaire statements of Experiment 1
are shown in Table 4. Statistical significances were observed in
Q5 (z = −3.662, p < 0.001), Q8 (z = −2.695, p = 0.007), Q12
(z = −3.935, p < 0.001), and Q13 (z = −3.413, p = 0.001,
Figure 2A). The SCR value was significantly higher in the
synchronous than in the asynchronous condition (z = −1.964,
p = 0.050; sync. median = 2.750, async. median = 2.190,
Figure 2B). These results suggest that in the synchronous
condition the participants felt that their 1PP seemed to be in
the back of their body (Q8). More importantly, they felt that
the virtual body in front of them was theirs (Q5). The tactile
stimulations were felt to be where they saw the virtual body being
touched (Q12) and was caused by the brush touching the virtual
body (Q13).
TABLE 4 | Median values and interquartile ranges (IQRs) for each question in four experiments.
Quest. Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Sync. Async. Sync. Async. Sync. Async. Basic Walking Visual
Q1 0 (−2, 1.5) 0 (−1, 1.5) 2 (1, 2) 1 (−1.5, 2) 1 (0, 2.75) 0.5 (−1, 2) 1 (−1.5, 1) 1 (−0.5, 2) 2 (1, 2.5)
Q2 −1 (−2, 0.75) 0 (−1, 2) 1 (−1, 2) 1.5 (−1.75, 2) 0 (−1, 2) 1 (−0.5, 2) −1 (−2, 0)
Q3 −1 (−2, 1) −2 (−2.5, 0) 2 (−0.75, 2) 1 (−2, 2) −1 (−2, 1) −1 (−2, 0) −2 (−3, 0) 3 (2, 3) 1 (−1, 2)
Q4 −0.5 (−2, 1) −1 (−1.75, 1.75) 2 (1.25, 3) 2 (2, 3) 2 (1, 3) −2 (−3, −1) 1 (−0.5, 3)
Q5 2 (1, 3) −2 (−2.5, 0) 3 (2, 3) 1.5 (−1.75, 3) 3 (2, 3) 0 (−2, 1) 3 (2.5, 3) 3 (2, 3) 3 (2, 3)
Q6 1 (0, 2) 1 (−1.75, 2) 0 (−1.5, 1) 1 (−0.5, 3)
Q7 0 (−1, 2) 0.5 (−1.75, 2) 0.5 (−2, 1) 2 (1, 3)
Q8 2 (1, 3) 1 (−1, 2) 1 (−0.75, 2) 1 (0, 2) 1 (−1, 2) 0 (−1.75, 2) 1 (0, 2.5) 2 (1, 3) 2 (1, 3)
Q9 1 (−0.5, 2) 0 (−1, 1.5) 1 (0, 2) 2 (−1, 2) 1 (−0.75, 2) 2 (−0.5, 2) 1 (−0.5, 2) 2 (1, 2.5) 2 (1, 3)
Q10 0 (−2, 2) 0 (−2, 2) 1 (−1, 2) 1 (−0.75, 2) 2 (−0.75, 2) 2 (1, 2) −1 (−2, 2) 1 (0, 2) 2 (1, 2.5)
Q11 3 (2, 3) 3 (1, 3) 3 (2, 3) 3 (3, 3) 3 (3, 3) 3 (2, 3) 3 (3, 3) 3 (3, 3) 3 (3, 3)
Q12 2 (1.5, 2.5) −2 (−3, 0.5)
Q13 2 (−1, 3) −2 (−3, −2)
The data marked in red color represent significant comparisons in the experiments.
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FIGURE 2 | Results of Experiment 1. (A) Questionnaire results. There were
significant differences between the synchronous and the asynchronous
conditions regarding body ownership (Q5), 1PP- location vs. body-location
(Q8), and touch referral (Q12 and Q13). (B) SCR results. The SCR values were
significantly higher in the synchronous than in the asynchronous condition
when the knife threats were applied to the participant’s physical body (which
was viewed via the HMD from the adopted 3PP). Significance levels:
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; and ***p ≤ 0.001.
Experiment 2
The median values and IQRs are presented in Table 4. The value
of Q5 was significantly higher in the synchronous than in the
asynchronous condition (z = −2.619, p = 0.009, Figure 3A),
as was also true for the SCR values (z = −3.621, p < 0.001;
sync. median = 3.061, async. median = 1.342, Figure 3B). The
results indicate that, compared with the asynchronous condition,
the participants in the synchronous condition experienced
ownership of the virtual body in front of them.
FIGURE 3 | Results of Experiment 2. (A) Questionnaire results. A significant
difference existed between the synchronous and the asynchronous conditions
regarding full-body ownership (Q5). (B) SCR results. When the knife threats
were applied to the participant’s physical body, the SCR values were
significantly higher in the synchronous than in the asynchronous condition.
Significance levels: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; and ***p ≤ 0.001.
Experiment 3
See Table 4 for the median values and IQRs. The value of Q5 was
significantly higher in the synchronous than in the asynchronous
condition (z = −3.308, p = 0.001, Figure 4A), and the SCR
values also followed this pattern (z = −3.920, p < 0.001; sync.
median = 3.210, async. median = 1.175, Figure 4B). This also
indicates that illusory ownership of the virtual body was induced
in the synchronous condition.
Experiment 4
As for the previous experiments, median values and IQRs are
presented in Table 4. Using Friedman’s analyses, we found that
there were significant effects in Q1 (χ2 = 16.333, p < 0.001),
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FIGURE 4 | Results of Experiment 3. (A) Questionnaire results. A significant
difference existed between the synchronous and the asynchronous conditions
regarding full-body ownership (Q5). (B) SCR results. The SCR values were
also significantly higher in the synchronous than in the asynchronous condition
when the knife threats were applied to the participant’s physical body.
Significance levels: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; and ***p ≤ 0.001.
Q2 (χ2 = 13.547, p = 0.001), Q3 (χ2 = 30.644, p < 0.001), Q4
(χ2 = 23.741, p < 0.001), and Q10 (χ2 = 6.206, p = 0.045).
Then we conducted Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with Bonferroni
correction (α = 0.05/3 = 0.017). The results are presented
in Table 5 (Figures 5A,C,E). Finally, paired Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests showed two other significant differences regarding Q6
(Walking vs. Basic: z = −2.049, p = 0.040, Figure 5B) and Q7
(Visual vs. Basic: z =−3.202, p= 0.001, Figure 5D).
DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigated self-location by a series of full-body
experiments. The findings of Experiment 1 were all consistent
with the results reported by Lenggenhager et al. (2007), indicating
that we successfully induced a version of out-of-body illusion
in the synchronous condition where the participants stood
still. In addition to synchronized visual-tactile stimulations,
Experiments 2 and 3 brought in different types of movement
to induce two different versions of full-body illusion. In the
Walking condition, the participants experienced illusory full-
body ownership during their walking movement. In the Visual
condition, ownership of the virtual body was induced while
the participants felt that their 1PP-location was systematically
receding. These three experiments provide a good basis for
the comparison between body-location and 1PP-location in
Experiment 4.
The results of Experiment 4 enable us to address the two issues
raised in the Introduction. First, can the spatial unity between
body-location and 1PP-location be temporarily modified? Our
results have shown that they can. They are different subjective
experiences. Compared with the Basic condition, the Walking
condition significantly changed the participants’ sense of body-
location without affecting their sense of 1PP-location, and they
felt as if their body left the position of their 1PP (Figures 5A,B).
Also, compared with the Basic condition, the Visual condition
modulated the sense of 1PP-location such that the participants
felt as if their 1PP had left their body (Figures 5C,D). Finally,
we observed significant differences between the sense of
1PP-location and the sense of body-location in the comparison
between the Visual and the Walking conditions (Figure 5E).
These results strongly suggest that the sense of where my 1PP is
positioned and the subjective feeling of where I feel my body is
located are not the same experiences.
Second, is it possible for healthy subjects to have the illusory
experience of owning two bodies? This can be addressed by the
data of Experiment 4 about the double-body effect. The score
of Q10 in the Visual condition was significantly higher than
the Basic condition (Figure 5C, Table 4), indicating that illusory
ownership of two bodies is indeed possible. This finding fits well
with the report by Lenggenhager et al. (2007) that “None of the
participants reported sensations of overt disembodiment” (2007,
1097). Although, the participants felt as if they were watching
themselves from a position separated from their body-location,
their sense of 1PP-location remained embodied. Hence, given the
data on the double-body effect, recognizing the distinct role of
1PP-location in the sense of self-location will not risk falling back
to the dualism between self and body.
We think that body-location and 1PP-location are interrelated
but distinct factors that jointly support the sense of self-location.
Based on our findings, we suggest that, instead of defining self-
location only in terms of body-location, the sense of self-location
can be better characterized as the subjective experience of where
I am in space that results from the interaction between body-
location and 1PP-location. Below we discuss the implications of
our experimental data and compare with other studies.
(1) Petkova et al. (2011) argued that viewing the virtual
body from 1PP was absolutely crucial for body-ownership
illusions to occur. They criticized the 3PP set-up that, since
watching the virtual body from 3PP was similar to recognizing
oneself on a monitor, the outcome could be just a visual
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TABLE 5 | Experiment 4: Paired comparisons of questionnaire scores.
Quest. Walking vs. Basic Visual vs. Basic Visual vs. Walking
z p Cohen’s r z p Cohen’s r z p Cohen’s r
Q1 −1.469 0.142 0.208 −3.580 <0.001 0.506 −3.225 0.001 0.456
Q2 −0.501 0.617 0.071 −2.875 0.004 0.407 −2.948 0.003 0.417
Q3 −4.135 <0.001 0.585 −3.514 <0.001 0.497 −3.468 0.001 0.490
Q4 −4.106 <0.001 0.581 −1.543 0.123 0.218 −3.582 <0.001 0.507
Q10 −2.026 0.043 0.287 −2.757 0.006 0.390 −1.662 0.096 0.235
All values were rounded off to the 3rd decimal place. The values in red color represent significant differences. Z-values and p-values are from matched pairs Wilcoxon tests, and effect
size is reported by Cohen’s r.
self-recognition “without necessarily experiencing a somatic
illusion of ownership” (Petkova et al., 2011, p. 5; cf. also Ehrsson,
2008). In both Lenggenhager et al. (2007) and in our experiments,
the subjects watched the virtual body from 3PP via an HMD;
hence, both studies would face the above criticism. However,
in our Experiments 1–3 we measured the participants’ SCR
to acquire psychological evidence. Since Lenggenhager et al.
(2007) did not do this, our SCR data can be considered as a
significant supplement to their pioneering work and can help
respond to the above criticism. The significant differences in
SCR values between the synchronous and the asynchronous
conditions in Experiments 1–3 suggest that the participants’
experiences went beyond mere visual self-recognition. Although,
there can be alternative interpretations and the issue remains
open, the SCR data reported here provide new support for the
view that it is possible for 3PP set-ups to induce body-ownership
illusions.
(2) Our findings about the double-body effect was consistent
with the study by Heydrich et al. (2013), where two different
methods (an HMD-camera set-up and virtual reality techniques)
were used to induce the experience of owning two bodies. Also, as
mentioned in the Introduction, our previous study on the “self-
touching illusion” also demonstrated that the double-body effect
is possible: the subject sat face to face with the experimenter, and
both used their right hand to touch each other’s left hand with
a paintbrush. Under synchronous visual-tactile manipulations,
many subjects felt as if they had two bodies (Liang et al., 2015,
p. 3–5, Supplementary Materials). So we think that it is possible
to induce the double-body effect in healthy subjects.
The set-up of our previous study was similar to the study
of body-swap illusion by Petkova and Ehrsson (2008). In
one of their experiments (Experiment 5), using visual-tactile
manipulations the participant and the experimenter faced each
other and squeezed each other’s hands synchronously (cf. their
Figure 6). Many subjects reported that “I was shaking hands
with myself!,” supported by SCR measurements. In another
experiment (their Experiment 1), the double-body effect was
measured by questionnaire, but no such effect was observed
(cf. their Figure 2). Petkova and Ehrsson interpreted these
results as showing that the participants felt that their body
swapped with someone else’s. On the face of it, the body-
swap illusion and the double-body effect seem to be different
phenomena. Do these experimental results count as against
our view? We do not think so. Although, their Experiment 5
involved a subject-experimenter interaction, no questionnaire
measurements were conducted and hence the double-body effect
was not really tested. In their Experiment 1, the participants
only passively received tactile stimulations while viewing a
mannequin, and the camera remained still throughout the
process (cf. also Petkova et al., 2011). This was very different
from the set-up of our current study: compared with the
Basic condition, the data of the Visual condition showed
that the movement of the camera significantly enhanced the
double-body effect. Hence, our view remains sustained that,
under the manipulation of moving the camera away from the
participants, the experience of owning two bodies could be
induced.
(3) We have suggested that there is a sense of embodiment
associated with the sense of 1PP-location. We would like to
further suggest that this sense of embodiment in the 1PP-
location is distinct from the sense of 3PP body-location. In
both the front-stroking and the back-stroking paradigms, while
the participants see their body in front of them via the HMD,
the sense of embodiment in the 1PP-location does not rely
on viewing the body. In our experiments, the virtual body
was seen from the adopted 3PP. The synchronized visual-
tactile manipulations caused vision to dominate over tactile
sensations and proprioception, such that the illusory sense of
self-location was induced. This was consistent with the study
by Lenggenhager et al. (2007), in which many participants
“mislocalized themselves toward the virtual body” (2007, p.
1096).
In contrast, the sense of embodiment in the 1PP-location is
part of everyday experience. We feel that we have a body in
(or in line with) the 1PP-location, from where we can perceive,
touch, and act upon the world. This sense of embodiment in
the 1PP-location is natural and does not depend on seeing one’s
own body. Moreover, in the Visual condition, the participants’
self-location was manipulated by the movement of the stereo
camera causing change in the optic flow registered from the
1PP, such that the 1PP-location was felt as if it was receding.
Although, the participant stood still, the change in optic flow
modified the vestibular sense and elicited an illusory sense of
oneself moving backward (illusory self-motion). Previous studies
have suggested that vestibular signals can contribute to the sense
of self-motion (MacNeilage et al., 2012; Lopez et al., 2013; Barry
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FIGURE 5 | Comparisons of Experiment 4. (A) Comparison of the Walking
and Basic conditions. The data values of Q3 and Q4 were significantly
different, indicating the change in the sense of body-location in the Walking
condition. (B) Comparison of the Walking and Basic conditions for Q6. The
significant difference for Q6 indicated the discrepancy between the sense of
body-location and the sense of 1PP-location in the Walking condition.
(C) Comparison of the Visual and Basic conditions. The significant differences
in Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q10 indicated that in the Visual condition there was
change in the sense of 1PP-location and the sense of body-location, and that
the double-body effect was induced. (D) Comparison of the Visual and Basic
conditions for Q7. The significant difference for Q7 indicated the discrepancy
between 1PP-location and body-location in the Visual condition.
(E) Comparison of the Visual and Walking conditions. There were significant
differences in 1PP-location (Q1 and Q2), and body-location (Q3 and Q4),
indicating that the senses of 1PP-location and body-location were distinct
between the Visual and the Walking conditions. Significance levels: *p ≤ 0.05;
**p ≤ 0.01; and ***p ≤ 0.001.
and Burgess, 2014), and that optic flow can elicit illusory self-
motion (DeAngelis and Angelaki, 2012). Also, Lenggenhager
and Lopez (2015) suggested that the vestibular system could
influence full-body ownership and self-location (2015, p. 17–
19). So we think that in the Visual condition the visual 1PP
dominated the vestibular signals, such that there is a sense of
embodiment tied to the participant’s 1PP-location. Therefore,
both daily experience and our experimental set-up suggest that
the sense of embodiment in the 1PP-location is different from the
sense of body-location experienced from the 3PP.
(4) In a review article, Blanke (2012) remarks that “In rare
instances, however, self-location and first-person perspective can
be experienced at different positions, suggesting that it may be
possible to experimentally induce similar dissociations in healthy
subjects.” Blanke cites the study of OBE by De Ridder et al.
(2007) for empirical support, in which a 63-year-old patient
was described as follows: “His perception of disembodiment
always involved a location about 50 cm behind his body and off
to the left... The environment was visually perceived from his
real-person perspective, not from the disembodied perspective”
(2007, p. 1830). As we see it, two different notions of 1PP were
involved in this rare case: the “real-person perspective” and the
“disembodied perspective.” The notion of 1PP in Blanke’s remark
refers to the “real-person perspective,” which was tied to the
patient’s body-location. What makes this case perplexing was
that the patient’s sense of self-location split and linked to both
the “real-person perspective” and the “disembodied perspective.”
Nonetheless, the patient’s self-location still involved both the
sense of body-location and the sense of 1PP-location in an
unusual way, which was compatible with our view.
(5) Finally, a very useful account of self-location was
recently proposed by Maselli (2015), in which she compared the
front-stroking and the back-stroking paradigms. In our terms,
this account proposes that in both paradigms self-location is
intrinsically connected with and influenced by an embodied
1PP-location, but in very different ways. In the front-stroking
paradigm, the experimental manipulation was designed to affect
the participant’s perceived self-location coded in an allocentric
framework. In some studies within this paradigm (Ehrsson,
2007; Guterstam and Ehrsson, 2012), the visual and tactile
sensations were both felt in the embodied 1PP-location, such
that “the illusory self-location corresponds to the position of the
visual-perspective” (Maselli, 2015, p. S310, author’s emphases).
In the back-stroking case, the multisensory conflicts can cause
a re-coding of the peripersonal space (touch referral) and
induce “a spatial dissociation between visual-perspective and
self-location” (Maselli, 2015, p. S310, author’s emphases). Thus,
Maselli suggests that the sense of self-location can be regarded
as “the blending of two parallel representations: the abstract
allocentric coding of the position occupied in the environment,
mainly associated with the visual-perspective, and the egocentric
mapping of somatosensory sensations into the external space,
mainly associated with peripersonal space” (2015, p. S310,
author’s emphases).
We fully agree with Maselli that both allocentric and
egocentric representations are required to account for self-
location. We also welcome the emphasis on the role of 1PP
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in her account. However, there is a difference between her
view and ours. Maselli (2015) describes self-location as “the
experience of occupying a given position in the environment”
(2015, p. S309). This is the natural understanding mentioned in
the beginning of the Introduction. But she further characterizes
self-location as “the perceived position of the body in space”
(2015, p. S309). So she also understands self-location in terms of
body-location. As the case of OBE and our experimental results
indicated above, we think that it is insufficient to characterize
self-location only via body-location. In this regard, our view
is different from Maselli’s. We propose the following picture:
body-location and 1PP-location are two distinct factors that are
spatially integrated most of the time, but this integration can be
temporarily interrupted in a pathological case or an experimental
set-up. Even when the spatial unity of body-location and 1PP-
location is temporarily modified, as induced in the back-stroking
paradigm, both of these factors continue to interact with each
other tomaintain an illusory sense of self-location. In our picture,
the sense of body-location and the sense of 1PP-location are
interrelated factors that jointly support the sense of self-location.
On the one hand, both the “3PP body-location” in the back-
stroking paradigm and the “illusory body-location” in the front-
stroking paradigm are anchored in the subject’s 1PP-location. On
the other hand, 1PP-location is not an abstract geometric point.
Rather, it is a subjective experience essentially tied to a sense of
embodiment. Self-location results from the interaction between
body-location and 1PP-location. If fact, we do not consider our
picture to be fundamentally different from Maselli’s. However,
we do think that when Maselli specifies self-location in terms
of the blending of allocentric and egocentric representations, her
account is more congenial to our proposal here than construing
self-location exclusively in terms of body-location.
CONCLUSION
This study investigated self-location by manipulating 1PP-
location and body-location. The new methods introduced here—
participants’ walking movement vs. the displacement of the
stereo camera—generated different subjective experiences. Since
the sense of self-location is crucial for one’s interaction with
the environment, we believe that recognizing the distinctive
roles of 1PP-location and body-location would contribute to a
better picture of environmental adaptation. We would like to
make three concluding remarks. First, to situate our study in
a broad picture, consider the two different paradigms reviewed
by Rosch (2000). One is “analytic science”: according to Rosch,
“The analytic picture offered by the cognitive sciences is this:
the world consists of separate objects and states of affairs ...
it deals with isolated units” (2000, p. 189–190). The other
is “biofunctionalism”: as Rosch characterizes it, in daily life
there is “a powerful intuition of wholeness which goes beyond
conceptual analysis into isolated units” (2000, p. 190). As
Gibson suggested, “the words animal and environment make an
inseparable pair. Each term implies the other” (Gibson, 1979, p.
8). In our experiments, the visual perspective was manipulated
such that it felt as if the participant’s 1PP was separated from
his/her body. This was not an ordinary context. In this sense,
we agree that our experiments are within the paradigm of
analytic science. So what we have achieved is very modest:
we have only demonstrated that the sense of 1PP-location
and the sense of body-location can be manipulated selectively
in specific settings. We do not claim that our experimental
results may automatically apply to ordinary contexts. Second,
based on the findings about the double-body effect, we have
suggested that 1PP-location is essentially embodied. Hence,
both the sense of 1PP-location and the sense of body-location
are embodied experiences. We think that both 1PP-location
and body-location are inherent in the subjective experience
of self-location. The sense of 1PP-location and the sense of body-
location jointly contribute to shaping one’s experience of self-
location. Finally, we would like to suggest an issue for further
study. The double-body effect certainly requires further study,
and it would be significant to investigate the neural mechanisms
that are responsible for self-location as well as the double-
body effect. They may help to explain the tremendous flexibility
of our bodily experiences in coping with novel environmental
challenges. We think that our experiments, especially the
Walking and the Visual conditions, could contribute to this
endeavor.
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